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The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization 
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policy implication is that a free press is a necessary pre-condition for successful 
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It is a consensus that corruption is one of the most serious problems in developing
countries, in the scientiﬁc as well as in the public discussion. The question of how
to tackle corruption in developing countries is not yet answered convincingly. One re-
peatedly proposed solution is to implement bureaucratic or inter-regional competition
through ﬁscal decentralization [see, e.g., Fisman and Gatti (2002a) or Arikan (2004)].
Competition might strengthen the accountability of bureaucrats and, thus, reduce the
ability of public oﬃcials to extract rents. Referring to these arguments, the poverty
reduction programs of international institutions contain decentralization as a substan-
tive instrument. For example, 12 percent of World Bank projects completed between
1993 and 1997 involved decentralizing responsibilities to lower levels of government
[Litvack et al. (1998)]. More recently, in 2006 more than 19 percent, or 4.5 billion dol-
lars, of the World Bank budget was spent on decentralization projects [Development
Committee (2006)]. Nevertheless, there is some doubt concerning the eﬀectiveness of
this development strategy.
To assess whether or not decentralization is recommendable for a certain policy pur-
pose, it is necessary to analyze the eﬀects of decentralization considering the whole
country-speciﬁc institutional framework. Although most empirical studies found lower
corruption in decentralized countries, we argue that the positive eﬀects of decentral-
ization do not prevail if comprehensive public monitoring does not exist. The main
questions of our paper are the following: Can we identify a complementary relationship
between decentralization and the eﬀectiveness of monitoring of bureaucrats and its in-
ﬂuence on corruption? Is decentralization in either case the right medicine against the
corruption disease? Or in short, does one size ﬁts all?
For this purpose we estimate a cross-section of 64 countries using alternative decen-
tralization and corruption measures. We show that the established positive eﬀect of
decentralization disappears for most speciﬁcations in our broader data set. We there-
after estimate a structural break model, controlling for a complementary relationship
between decentralization and the eﬀectiveness of public monitoring of bureaucrats –
measured by the index of freedom of the press. Our main ﬁnding is that decentralization
counteracts corruption in countries with a high degree of freedom of the press, while
countries with a low degree of freedom of the press suﬀer from decentralization. Our
results imply that decentralization projects in developing countries should be accom-
panied by other institutions acting as supervisory body that strengths accountability
of bureaucrats, such as a free press.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the related theoretical and
empirical literature and discusses the extent to which the results are applicable for
developing countries. Section 3 describes our data and empirical methodology. Section
4 presents the estimation results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
22 Related literature
2.1 Some theoretical considerations
The predictions of theoretical models concerning the impact of decentralization on
corruption are ambiguous. Models favoring decentralization are based on the implicit
assumption that a working information infrastructure exists within a country. For ex-
ample, yardstick competition models assume that people could compare policy out-
comes in their home jurisdiction with neighboring regions, requiring free information
ﬂows. Similarly, models based on a tax-competition framework need free information
ﬂows as well as mobile capital and/or labor. The mechanism driving corruption down
in such models is (political) competition. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that “Coun-
tries with more political competition have stronger public pressure against corruption –
through laws, democratic elections, and even the independent press – and so are more
likely to use government organizations that contain rather than maximize corruption
proceeds.”[Shleifer and Vishny (1993), p. 610]. There are also models implying a neg-
ative impact of decentralization on corruption. These models emphasize the danger of
close connections between local interest groups and local decision makers.
In their seminal paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) discuss corruption in a double
marginalization framework. They argue that diﬀerent monopolistic bureaucrats set
their bribery demands independently in order to maximize their own beneﬁt without
taking the negative externalities on other bureaucrats into account. In this case, vertical
decentralization leads to greater dispersion of government decision-making powers, and
the lack of coordination among bureaucrats results in excessive rent extraction. 2 How-
ever, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also emphasize that horizontal decentralization leads
to decreasing corruption through strengthening the competition between bureaucrats.
Prud’homme (1995) provides an argument against decentralization. He argues that
there are more opportunities for corruption at the local level because local politicians
and bureaucrats are likely to be more subject to the pressing demands of local interest
groups. Moreover, local decision makers have usually more discretionary powers than
national oﬃcials, increasing the negative eﬀect of decentralization. He also discusses
the role of an independent press in the context of decentralization and corruption,
arguing that “In some countries, at least, national bureaucracies have a tradition of
honesty that is often absent at the local level. The pressure of media, inasmuch as
it exists, would also be a greater disincentive at the national than at the local level”
[Prud’homme (1995), p. 211]. In the same vein, Tanzi (1995) argues on the basis of
2 A timely application of the Shleifer and Vishny (1993) model is provided by Bennett and
Estrin (2006). The authors analyze the relationship between centralized or decentralized in-
frastructure provision and corruption in developing economies. The impact of decentralization
on corruption was ambiguous depending on the eﬃciency of the tax system, the venality of
bureaucrats, and other issues.
3local interest groups. He states that corruption may be more common at the local level
compared to the national level, in particular in developing countries. Local oﬃcials
live closer to the citizens and this contiguity leads to a higher impact of local interest
groups and a higher level of corruption in decentralized countries.
An ambiguous eﬀect of decentralization on corruption appears if the quality of bureau-
crats is considered. Persson and Tabellini (2000a) assume that working in a central
government provides more prestige and power to the agents in contrast to a local gov-
ernment. Thus, monitoring may be more intense on the central level, and eﬀorts by
centralized bureaucrats may be greater, reducing corruption.
However, Persson and Tabellini (2000a) discuss that this eﬀect is mitigated by diﬀer-
ences in central and local bureaucrats’ responsibilities. Central bureaucrats are respon-
sible for various tasks and localities simultaneously, whereas under decentralization,
agents are often responsible for a single task in a single jurisdiction. In the ﬁrst case,
only the aggregate performance of politicians matters for reappointment. The indirect
accountability weakens the incentives to perform well, since there is a smaller link be-
tween eﬀort and rewards. In contrast, in a decentralized government, decision makers
are held accountable for all of their actions. Therefore, decentralization may increase
ﬁscal performance and decrease corruption. The equilibrium impact of decentralization
on corruption remains unclear.
More recent studies rely on competition between jurisdictions. Applying a tax-compet-
ition framework, Arikan (2004) shows that an increasing degree of competition for
mobile capital between jurisdictions leads to less corrupt bureaucrats. In the yardstick
competition model by Dincer et al. (2006) voters compare the policy outcomes in
their home jurisdiction with their neighbor regions and thus implement interregional
competition. Under certain circumstances, this yardstick competition may lead to lower
levels of corruption. 3 As mentioned at the beginning of this section, it is noteworthy
to examine the application of these theoretical models to developing countries.
Studies on decentralization and corruption considering the speciﬁc institutional prob-
lems of developing countries are rare. A criticism of the applicability of the classical
Tiebout (1956) approach to developing countries brings up Bardhan (2002), arguing:
“(...) the information and accounting systems and mechanisms of monitoring of public
bureaucrats are much weaker in low-income countries. (...) Thus, the diﬀerential eﬃ-
cacy of such mechanisms under centralization and decentralization becomes important”
[Bardhan (2002), p. 188]. Moreover, he argues that mechanisms of political account-
3 Careaga and Weingast (2000) and Rodden (2000) contribute to the literature on decentral-
ization and corruption by distinguishing between diﬀerent kinds of decentralization. It turns
out to be important whether the expenditures of sub-national governments are ﬁnanced by
own revenue sources or not, because central government transfers give local decision makers
the incentive to ignore the budgetary consequences of their mismanagement.
4ability are especially weak in developing countries, and “(...) any discussion of delivery
of public services has to grapple with issues of capture of governments at diﬀerent tiers
by elite groups more seriously than is the custom in the traditional decentralization lit-
erature.” 4 With capture of local governments, in the sense of elites receiving a larger
weight in the local government’s welfare function, there is a tendency for the local
government to provide a service to local elites excessively at the expense of the non-
elite [Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006a)]. Therefore, in developing countries, there is no
a priori verdict in favor of decentralization. The existence of appropriate monitoring
abilities might inﬂuence the impact of decentralization on corruption.
All in all, an important issue is that in almost all theoretical model which favor decen-
tralization, the free ﬂow of information plays an important role. If the monitoring of
bureaucrats works, decentralization might indeed decrease corruption through political
competition. A free and independent press is able to reveal and report misuses of pub-
lic oﬃce for private gain. It complements the competition and accountability eﬀects
of decentralization. Persons concerned with corruption can reveal the bureaucrat’s be-
havior to a journalist and the media reports will raise the costs for the bureaucrat as
the probability of being detected and punished is increased. Conversely, if the press
is under the control of an autocratic administration, the abuse of authority is virtu-
ally less risky for bureaucrats. In this case, decentralization does not work. However,
in most developing countries the existing information infrastructure is controlled by
corrupt or autocratic oﬃcials. Assumptions of models favoring centralization seem to
be more appropriate for developing countries. Our hypothesis is that decentralization
is a suitable instrument for controlling corruption in countries with an appropriate
information infrastructure, while countries without these necessary information ﬂows
may suﬀer from decentralization.
2.2 Previous empirical studies on corruption and decentralization
The majority of empirical studies have found corruption to be lower in decentralized
countries. These studies, however, do not consider the weak institutional structure of
developing countries, such as the low degree of press freedom, which hampers the public
monitoring of bureaucrats. In the following, we survey the most important empirical
studies and discuss possible extensions in respect to our main research question.
An initial empirical investigation is provided by Huther and Shah (1998), who found a
negative correlation between the degree of expenditure decentralization and the level
of corruption. Corruption is measured by a governance index for 80 developed and
developing countries. They report a signiﬁcant Pearson correlation coeﬃcient, but due
to the fact that no control variables are considered, omitted variables might bias the
4 See Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006a) for details.
5results. Furthermore, from correlation it is not necessarily possible to draw conclusions
about the causal relationship.
Treisman (2000) analyzes the causes of corruption and takes the federal structure into
account. He ﬁnds a negative relationship between a dummy variable reﬂecting whether
a country has a federal or unitary constitution and the absence of corruption. 5 In
contrast to the aim of our paper such a federal dummy does not necessarily reﬂect ‘de
facto’ decentralization. The existence of a federal constitution itself does not necessar-
ily reﬂect that sub-national governments have appreciable authority or autonomy in
decision making. The study of Treisman (2000) is, thus, not comparable to the results
of other papers measuring decentralization through ﬁnancial accounts or the like. 6
A positive impact of ﬁscal decentralization on the absence of corruption is found by Fis-
man and Gatti (2002a). However, with regard to our theoretical discussion in section 2.1
the results of this study remain inconclusive concerning to the eﬀects of decentralization
in less developed countries. The authors do not consider subsamples for less developed
countries, taking into account that the inﬂuence of decentralization on corruption may
be reversed in diﬀerent institutional frameworks as suggested by Prud’homme (1995),
Litvack et al. (1998), Bardhan (2002), and others. Nevertheless, we use this inﬂuential
study as benchmark for ours.
Fisman and Gatti (2002b) study the relationship between corruption in U.S. states
and dependency on central government transfers. They found corruption is positively
associated with larger federal transfers. Moreover, their results imply that diﬀerent
types of decentralization do not always have the same impact on corruption, supporting
theoretical predictions of Careaga and Weingast (2000) and Rodden (2000).
A comparable study to Fisman and Gatti (2002a) is Arikan (2004), who analyzes the
impact of several decentralization measures on Transparency International’s Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index in a cross-country data set. She also found corruption to be lower
in decentralized countries. However, considering endogeneity, the weak signiﬁcant re-
lationship turned to insigniﬁcance in almost all estimation speciﬁcations. Lederman
et al. (2005) analyze the impact of diﬀerent political institutions including decentral-
ization on corruption based on a panel data set of several developed and developing
countries. Using the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) corruption index, they
ﬁnd that central government transfers to other levels of national government decreases
corruption.
Dincer et al. (2006) analyze U.S. state level corruption and dependency on the degree of
expenditure decentralization in a panel data set. They ﬁnd some evidence for corruption
5 Note that almost all studies, like ours, use corruption measures which have high values for
a low level of corruption, thereby measuring the ‘absence of corruption’. See section 3.2 for
details.
6 See section 3.1 for details on the measurement of decentralization.
6being smaller in more decentralized states as well as strong evidence for the eﬀects of
yardstick competition. However, the results do not remain signiﬁcant when trying to
handle the problems arising from endogeneity.
Freille, Haque and Kneller (2007a) analyzes the impact of diﬀerent ﬁscal and con-
stitutional decentralization measures on corruption within a cross section data set of
177 countries. Their results suggest that both ﬁscal decentralization and constitutional
centralization are simultaneously associated with lower corruption. In contrast to the
most other studies they make use of a wide range of diﬀerent decentralization indicators
e.g. ﬁscal, constitutional, political and structural decentralization measures. However,
similar to the other studies discussed in our literature survey, they do not consider
possible complementary eﬀects of decentralization and the eﬀectiveness of monitoring
of bureaucrats. All studies discussed are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Previous empirical studies
Author(s) Dataa),b),c) Methodology Resultsd)
Huther Shah a) 80 countries Pearson correlation positive
(1998) b) ‘good governance’ measure
c) expenditure decentralization
Treisman a) up to 64 countries cross country negative
(2000) b) CPI index, Business international,
and Global competitiveness survey
WLS and OLS
c) federal dummy
Fisman Gatti a) up to 55 countries cross country positive
(2002a) b) CPI index, ICRG index, World
competitiveness report, German ex-
porter index, Business international,
and Global competitiveness survey
OLS and TSLS
c) expenditure decentralization
Fisman Gatti a) 50 U.S. states cross country positive
(2002b) b) convictions for abuse of public oﬃce OLS
c) share of federal transfers
Arikan a) 40 countries cross country positive
(2004) b) CPI index OLS and TSLS
c) number of local jurisdictions, share
of non-government employment, ex-
penditure decentralization
Lederman et al. a) 102 countries panel positive
(2005) b) ICRG index pooled OLS, ordered pro-
bit
c) central transfers
Dincer et al. a) 48 U.S. states panel positive
(2006) b) convictions for abuse of public oﬃce pooled OLS, RE and TSLS
c) expenditure decentralization
Freille et al. a) up to 177 countries cross section positive
(2007a) b) CPI index, ICRG index, World com-
petitiveness report
OLS and rolling regression
c) diﬀerent decentralization measures
a) sample and sample size, b) corruption measures, c) decentralization measures, d) positive results mean that
corruption is smaller in decentralized countries.
72.3 Previous empirical studies on corruption and freedom of press
The decision to participate in corrupt practices (like any other crime) mainly depends
on three factors. The beneﬁt factor is the size of payoﬀs that can be received by cor-
ruption. The costs of corruption depends the threatened amount of punishment when
being caught. The third combining factor is the probability of detection (see Becker
(1968)). A free and independent press is an important part of the detection process and
therefore lowers the expected utility of corruption. The majority of empirical studies
found that a free press is associated with lower corruption. In the following, we survey
the most important studies.
An initial empirical investigation is provided by Stapenhurst (2000), who ﬁnd a neg-
ative correlation between the freedom press and the level of corruption. He reports a
signiﬁcant Pearson correlation coeﬃcient, but due to the fact that no control variables
are considered, omitted variables might bias the results. Furthermore, from correlation
it is not necessarily possible to draw conclusions about the causal relationship.
Arend (2002) analyzes the relationship between corruption, press freedom and human
capital in a panel data set. He ﬁnds evidence for corruption being smaller in countries
with a higher degree of freedom of the press. Ahrend emphasizes that a high degree of
press freedom acts as a channel through which education decreases corruption.
Brunetti and Weder (2003) test for a large number of countries the hypothesis that
a free press is associated with lower levels of corruption. Brunetti and Weder use the
ICRG index and the press freedom measure provided by Freedom House. They ﬁnd
strong empirical evidence for a negative relation between the freedom of press and
corruption.
In contrast to other previous studies, Chowdhury (2004) analyzes the impact of the
freedom of press jointly with the level of democracy on corruption. Following Persson
and Tabellini (2000b) he proposes the following theoretical channel between the three
variables: First, the ability to monitor bureaucrats by a free press brings corruption
cases to the voters, and second, the voters in a democracy punish corrupt politicians
by ousting them from public oﬃces (see Chowdhury (2004), p. 93). He concludes that
both freedom of press and democracy are signiﬁcant controls on corruption.
Lederman et al. (2005) analyze the relationship between several political institutions
and corruption. They only ﬁnd weak evidence of an impact freedom of the press on the
level of corruption. The coeﬃcient on press freedom becomes insigniﬁcant when they
include a control variable of economic development in the regression.
The most resent study is by Freille, Haque and Kneller (2007b). The authors test
the relationship between press freedom and corruption performing a extrem bound
analysis. They ﬁnd evidence that both political and economic inﬂuences on the media
are strongly and robustly related to corruption, while detrimental laws and regulations
8inﬂuencing the media are not. However, none of the surveyed studies examines the pos-
sible complementary inﬂuence of decentralization and freedom of press on corruption.
The discussed studies are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
Previous empirical studies II
Author(s) Dataa),b),c) Methodology Resultsd)
Stapenhurst a) 51 counties Pearson correlation positive
(2000) b) CPI index
c) Freedom House Index
Ahrend a) 109 countries panel positive
(2002) b) ICRG index OLS
c) Freedom House index
Brunetti and Weder a) 125 countries cross section, panel positive
(2003) b) ICRG index OLS, TSLS, PROBIT
c) Freedom House index
Chowdhury a) 97 countries cross section, panel positive
(2004) b) CPI index OLS, TSLS, GMM
c) Freedom House index
Lederman et al. a) 145 countries panel insigniﬁcant
(2005) b) GCS, ICRG, WDR OLS, PROBIT
c) Freedom House index
Freille et al. a) 51 countries panel positive
(2007b) b) CPI index, ICRG index OLS, EBA, GMM
c) Freedom House index (disaggreg.)
a) sample and sample size, b) corruption measures, c) free press measures, d) positive results mean that corruption
is smaller with a free press.
While the relationship between decentralization and corruption is ambiguous in the
theoretical literature, the majority of empirical studies found corruption to be lower in
decentralized countries. Although parts of the theoretical literature emphasize that the
impact of decentralization on corruption depends on the eﬀectiveness of monitoring of
bureaucrats, none of these studies has considered this issue explicitly. The aim of our
paper is to investigate whether the public monitoring – reﬂected by freedom of the
press – has an impact on the inﬂuence of decentralization on corruption as discussed
by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Prud’homme (1995), Bardhan (2002) among others. For
this purpose we estimate a structural break model considering complementary eﬀects
of decentralization and freedom of the press.
3 The data
3.1 Decentralization measures
The proper deﬁnition of applicable decentralization measures is a challenging task.
Several measurement concepts have been elaborated in the literature. 7 One possibility
for the measurement of decentralization is to design indicators for the organization of
7 Excellent overviews of the problems of measuring ﬁscal decentralization are provided by
Treisman (2002), Rodden (2004) and Stegarescu (2005).
9governments with respect to laws and institutions from a political economy perspec-
tive. In particular, the indices of Treisman (2002) have often been used in the recent
literature, and thus, we adopt them for our analysis. Among others, Treisman has cre-
ated two decentralization measures: a federal dummy (FEDERAL) capturing whether
a federal constitution exists (1) or not (0) and a measure for the number of vertical
government tiers (TIERS). As these measures are constructed from formal national
law, we classify them as ‘de jure’ decentralization measures. Thus, these measures do
not necessarily reﬂect sub-national government authority or autonomous power in deci-
sion making. For this purpose we use ‘de facto’ decentralization measures, factoring in
the ﬁnancial resources of sub-national governments as compared to the central govern-
ment. To measure ‘de facto’ decentralization, we construct measures using the IMF’s
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), which provides data on central, state, and local
government revenues and expenditures for several developed and developing countries
since the early 1970s. Decentralization indices are calculated by relating the sum of
state and local expenditures (revenues) to the consolidated total government expendi-
tures (revenues). We use EXPDEC as an abbreviation for the degree of expenditure
decentralization and REVDEC for the degree of revenue decentralization.
Oates (1972) discusses the general limitations of such ‘classical’ decentralization mea-
sures. He basically argues that these measures do not always represent the actual degree
of decentralization because it is also important to consider the autonomy of sub-national
governments in expenditure or revenue decisions. Otherwise, if sub-national autonomy
is not taken into account, the ‘classical’ decentralization measures would indicate a
high level of decentralization, although a wide range of sub-national expenditure and
revenue decisions is determined by the federal government. For this reason, the OECD
has developed an internationally comparable framework to assess the degree of control
sub-central governments have over their revenues [see OECD (1999)]. Several authors,
e.g. Rodden (2004) and Stegarescu (2005), have applied this framework to create new
decentralization measures reﬂecting autonomy of sub-national jurisdictions. However,
as the data source suggests, these decentralization measures are available only for
OECD countries and therefore not applicable for a wide range of countries.
Following Arikan (2004), we consider a ﬁfth alternative decentralization measure, which
can be derived from the employment statistics compiled by the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO). These statistics contain data on public (and private) employment,
distinguishing between the national and sub-national government levels for numerous
countries. In the same manner as we proceeded with the other ‘de facto’ decentral-
ization measures, we can calculate the share of sub-national government employment
(EMPLDEC), which is the ratio of sub-national government employment to total gov-
ernment employment. Table A1 in the appendix reports the correlations for all decen-
tralization measures. Except for TIERS, all measures are positively correlated.
103.2 Corruption measures
Besides measures of decentralization, we also need adequate measures of corruption.
We make use of three diﬀerent commonly applied measures of corruption. The ﬁrst
measure is the corruption index provided by the PRS Group in the International Coun-
try Risk Guide (ICRG). This measure reﬂects the likelihood that government oﬃcials
will demand special payments and the extent to which illegal payments are expected
throughout lower levels of government. The ICRG index is based on a survey of inter-
national experts and has been available since the early 1980s [see Knack and Keefer
(1995)]. A second corruption index is provided by the World Bank and is commonly
known as the Kaufman index (WBC). This indicator is available beginning in 1996.
The third corruption measure, the corruption perception index (CPI), is provided by
Transparency International. The index is available beginning in 1980, but due to the
composition of the index, not comparable between years. 8
All of these measures reﬂect the absence of corruption: This means that a high value
indicates low corruption. The ICRG index is deﬁned between 0 and 6, the WBC index
between -2.5 and +2.5, and the CPI index between 0 and 10. For reasons of better
comparability of our diﬀerent estimation results, we have rescaled all three measures
so that they have values between zero (most corrupt) and one (least corrupt).
3.3 Monitoring of Bureaucrats – Freedom of the press measure
The aim of our study is to investigate whether the eﬀectiveness of monitoring of bu-
reaucrats determines the impact of decentralization on corruption. A commonly used
proxy for the observability of bureaucratic behavior is the index for freedom of the press
(e.g. Brunetti and Weder (2003)). We follow this approach and revert to the index for
freedom of the press provided by Freedom House. The data is available from 1980 to
the present and currently covers 194 countries. Country narratives examine the legal
environment for the media, political pressures that inﬂuence reporting, economic fac-
tors that aﬀect access to information, and repressive actions against journalists. These
four categories are rated for the print media as well as the broadcast media. The over-
all index ranges from 0 (total freedom of the press) to 100 (highest violation of press
freedom). Note that we have rescaled the index in such a way that high values indicate
a high degree of freedom of the press and low values the opposite.
3.4 Other explanatory variables
As the level of corruption in a country is not solely determined by decentralization and
freedom of press, our estimations include several control variables following previous
8 A discussion of time-series properties of the index is provided by Lambsdorﬀ (2005). Panel
data analysis is possible with a special data set starting in 1995.
11cross-country studies, e.g., the studies by Fisman and Gatti (2002a) and Arikan (2004).
Our baseline regression includes as control variables: the log of population size (POP),
the log of gross domestic product per capita in dollars at constant prices of the year
2000 (GDPPC), the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP as a measure
for the degree of openness (GLOBAL), the diversity index of ethnic fractionalization
(ETHNO), and the share of government expenditures in GDP as a measure for gov-
ernment size (GOVSIZE). Most of the data is provided by the World Bank in the
World Development Indicators 2006 (WDI). One exception is ethnic fractionalization,
which is provided by www.ethnologue.com. 9 Table 3 provides summary statistics of the
variables.
Table 3
Summary statistics, cross country data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ICRG (0...1) 64 .54 .20 .18 1.0
CPI (0...1) 64 .50 .24 .19 .97
WBC (0...1) 64 .57 .22 .28 .99
POP (Mio.) 64 60.80 180.00 1.20 1,150.00
GDPPC ($) 64 7,866 8,857 95.52 31,521
GOVSIZE 64 .16 .05 .06 .32
GLOBAL 64 .73 .35 .19 1.57
ETHNO 64 .40 .27 .02 .93
PRESS 64 64.9 20.7 18.1 92.7
FEDERAL 55 .27 .45 0 1
TIERS 61 3.59 .80 2 6
EMPLDEC 51 .44 .22 .08 .93
EXPDEC 64 .22 .14 .02 .57
REVDEC 64 .17 .13 .01 .53
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Benchmark regressions
As a benchmark case, we ﬁrst estimate the impact of decentralization on corruption
in a cross-country data set without testing for a complementary relationship between
decentralization and the eﬀectiveness of monitoring bureaucrat’s behaviour. This es-
timation approach enables us to compare our results with previous research studies
on the basis of a broader data set covering up to 64 countries. The basic estimation
equation has the form
CORRUPTi = α + β · CONTROLi + γ · DECENTRi + i (1)
9 See Table A2 in the appendix for data sources and deﬁnitions.
12where CORRUPT as dependent variable reﬂects the level of corruption in country
i, CONTROL is a vector of control variables mentioned above, and DECENTR
represents our diﬀerent decentralization measures. To avoid causality problems, the
timing of independent variables is chosen such that they are long averages for the period
1980-1995, prior to the corruption measures for 1996-2000. We are mainly interested
in the sign and signiﬁcance of γ, which might be positive, supporting the ﬁndings of
Fisman and Gatti (2002a), Arikan (2004), etc. or negative as in Treisman (2000). Note
that the corruption measures reﬂect the absence of corruption, and thus a positive sign
means a high degree of decentralization is associated with low corruption. We present
estimation results for three alternative corruption measures as dependent variables and
all mentioned decentralization measures, respectively.
Table 4 contains the cross-sectional results. White’s test for heteroskedasticity in the
residuals rejects the null of no heteroskedasticity; thus, all standard errors of coeﬃ-
cients are calculated using White (1980) correction. The coeﬃcients of our ‘de jure’
decentralization measures (FEDERAL and TIERS) are insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁ-
cations. A similar picture occurs for the employment decentralization measure. The
‘de facto’ decentralization measures (EXPDEC and REV DEC) have no signiﬁcant
impact on corruption with the ICRG index as the corruption measure (speciﬁcation 4
and 5) as well as with the WBC corruption measure. With the CPI index as the cor-
ruption measure, we obtain a positive and weakly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for EXPDEC
(speciﬁcation 9). REV DEC barely misses conventional signiﬁcance levels.
Our control variables show the expected signs and support the ﬁndings of earlier stud-
ies. The size of a country in terms of population (POP), the ethnic fractionalization
(ETHNO), and the economic openness (GLOBAL) have no signiﬁcant impact on
corruption. Richer countries (GDPPC) show less corruption capturing the eﬀect of
better institutions. Moreover, countries with a larger government (GOV SIZE) show
less corruption. Last but not least, countries with a high degree of press freedom show
less corruption (PRESS). Thus, we conclude from our benchmark analysis that the
positive impact of decentralization on the absence of corruption found in almost all
earlier studies is very sensitive to the underlying measurement concepts of both decen-
tralization and corruption, as well as to the sample of countries. In the next section,
we present evidence that the relationship between corruption and decentralization cru-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































144.2 Cross-sectional analysis considering monitoring eﬀectiveness
The hypothesis we test now is that the relationship between decentralization and cor-
ruption depends on the eﬀectiveness of monitoring of bureaucrats. As we have discussed
in section 2.1, most theoretical studies concerning the relationship between decentral-
ization and corruption assume free information ﬂows between the agents. For this
purpose we consider the freedom of the press as an indicator for the monitoring ef-
fectiveness and reinvestigate the relationship between decentralization and corruption.
As a ﬁrst step in our analysis we graphically investigate our data, before subsequently
specifying an econometric model to test our hypothesis.
Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of our whole data set with our ‘de facto’ decentralization
measure on the abscissa and the ICRG index on the ordinate. The eﬀectiveness of
monitoring is considered such that we classiﬁed our countries into three groups: the
upper third of countries with the highest degree of the freedom of the press measure is
marked by quadrangles, countries in the middle third are marked by dots, and those
in the lowest third of press freedom are stars. The ﬁgure also includes three trendlines,
each of which reﬂects the relationship between decentralization and corruption in the
three diﬀerent groups of countries.
The scatterplot suggests that the relationship between decentralization and corrup-
tion indeed depends on the eﬀectiveness of monitoring of bureaucrats reﬂected by the
freedom of the press. Countries with good monitoring show a positive impact of decen-
tralization on the absence of corruption (upper trendline in ﬁgure 1), countries with
middle monitoring come up with just a weak relationship (continuous line), and in
countries with weak monitoring, decentralization is negatively associated with the ab-
































lowest freedom of press middle freedom of press highest freedom of press
trend lowest trend middle trend highest
  Fig. 1. Decentralization, corruption and freedom of press. Note: decentralization is measured
by the degree of expenditure decentralization (EXPDEC), corruption is measured by the
ICRG index, and freedom of press are q-quantile dummy variables for q = 3.
Doubtlessly, the inspection of scatterplots is only a ﬁrst step in answering our research
question. Therefore, we set up an econometric model to test our hypothesis empirically.
For this purpose, we built dummy variables for q-quantiles of the freedom of the press
measure (FP1q,...,FPqq) and interact them with our decentralization measure in a
structural break model. For q = 3 we exactly estimate the trendlines of ﬁgure 1 distin-
guishing between the upper third, the middle third, and the lower third of countries in
respect to the degree of freedom of the press.
The estimation equation now takes the form




δk · (DECENTRi · FPkqi) +
q−1 X
k=1
θk · FPkqi + i. (2)
The interaction terms of decentralization and the q-quantile dummies show us whether
the relationship between decentralization and corruption depends on the monitoring
possibilities of bureaucrats. In other words: The interaction terms indicate whether
decentralization and eﬀectiveness of monitoring have a complementary eﬀect on cor-
16ruption or not. The FPkq-dummy for the countries with the highest q-quantile of the
freedom of the press measure is not considered in the estimations, and, thus, is used
as a reference group. γ captures the overall impact of decentralization on corruption,
while δk captures the partial eﬀect of the k interaction terms. We obtain the total
eﬀect of decentralization on corruption in the countries by adding the coeﬃcient of an
interaction term to the coeﬃcient of the general eﬀect.
Using dummy variables of the freedom of press measure allows us to interpret the results
much easier than using interaction terms of two continuous variables. In the latter case
the marginal eﬀects have to be calculated from diﬀerentiating our estimation equation,
while the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms using dummy variables are independent
from the other coeﬃcients. Moreover, varying q allows us to test for more than only one
structural break in the data as suggested by the graphical inspection of the data (ﬁgure
1). Nevertheless, we also report estimation results using a continuous interaction term
of decentralization and freedom of the press as a robustness test.
Due to space limitations, we subsequently present estimation results only for the ICRG
index as the corruption measure and EXPDEC as the decentralization measure in the
body of our paper. 10 Table 5 presents estimation results for three diﬀerent models. In
speciﬁcations (1) and (2), we estimate our model setting q = 2, which is similar to using
just one dummy (FP12) for the 50% of countries with the lowest degree of freedom
of the press. In the next two speciﬁcations we set q = 3, distinguishing between high,
middle, and low degrees of freedom of the press, which is a direct test of ﬁgure 1.
Thus, we have FP13 as a terzile dummy for those countries with the lowest degree of
freedom of the press, FP23 as a dummy for those countries with a middle degree of
freedom of the press, and FP33 as a dummy for the countries with the highest degree
of freedom of the press. Note that FP33 does not enter the regressions, as we use it as a
reference group. Furthermore, we drop the PRESS variable in our speciﬁcations when
considering interaction terms because the impact of the freedom of the press is now
covered by our FPkq-dummies. Speciﬁcations (5) and (6) present results we obtain
using an interaction term of decentralization and the freedom of press measure.
We apply the OLS estimation technique as well as TSLS to handle the problems aris-
ing from possible endogeneity bias. In order to control for reverse causation we use the
logarithm of each country’s area in square kilometers (AREA) as an instrument for
decentralization. An optimal instrument should aﬀect countries’ degree of decentral-
ization, but not aﬀect the degree of corruption. The area of a country should not have
any direct impact on the level of corruption, but it is often used as an explanatory
variable for the degree of ﬁscal decentralization [see e.g. Wasylenko (1987), Porta et al.
(1999), and Arikan (2004)]. We further on use the lag structure as in our benchmark
10 See Appendix Table A5 for robustness tests using alternative decentralization- and corrup-
tion measures.
17Table 5
Cross-section estimations considering the eﬀectiveness of public monitoring
Dependent variable: ICRG
q = 2 q = 3 interaction
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. .0679 -.0743 .1617 -.1228 -.0122 -.1893
(.25) (-.19) (.53) (-.28) (-.05) (-.55)
POP .0001 .0088 .0010 .0172 .0037 .0069
(.01) (.39) (.08) (.73) (.28) (.31)
GDPPC .0476*** .0493*** .0437*** .0430** .0450*** .0529***
(3.31) (3.23) (2.71) (2.46) (3.10) (3.17)
GOVSIZE .6099** .7024* .5990* .6600* .6269** .7393*
(2.05) (1.98) (1.92) (1.90) (2.14) (1.89)
ETHNO -.1032** -.1163*** -.1014** -.1436** -.0927* -.0754
(-2.08) (-2.19) (-2.17) (-2.30) (-1.95) (-1.02)
GLOBAL -.0371 -.0325 -.0407 .0006 -.0099 -.0321
(-.65) (-.55) (-.62) (.01) (-.16) (-.38)
PRESS .0005 .0019
(0.26) (.56)
EXPDEC .4848*** .3650 .3327** .3303 -.7024* -.4910















Obs. 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adj. R2 .73 .72 .72 .68 .69 .67
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels are reported as follows: * for a 90%-signiﬁcance-
level, ** for 95% and *** for more than 99%.
regressions.
Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) show that decentralization has a positive overall impact on
corruption, but exerts a negative impact in those countries with a low degree of freedom
of the press or in other words: with a less eﬀective monitoring of bureaucrats. On the
basis of the coeﬃcient of EXPDEC (0.4848) and the coeﬃcient of the interaction term
EXPDEC∗FP12 (-0.7322), the aggregate eﬀect of decentralization on corruption in
those countries with the 50% lowest degree of freedom of the press is 0.4848-0.7322=-
0.2474, ergo negative. The strong negative impact also holds for IV-estimations using
the logarithm of country’s area in square kilometers. Speciﬁcations (3) and (4) of Table
5 show estimations similar to the scatterplot of ﬁgure 1. The eﬀect of decentralization on
the absence of corruption is in general positive, while it is strongly negative in countries
with the lowest degree of freedom of the press (EXPDEC∗FP13). As the scatterplot
18already indicated we ﬁnd no eﬀect of decentralization on corruption in countries with
a middle degree of freedom of the press. Countries with a high degree of freedom of
the press serve as reference group: the coeﬃcient for those countries can be calculated
from the other coeﬃcients and remains positive.
The last two speciﬁcations in Table 5 present results using interaction terms of de-
centralization and freedom of the press without building dummy variables. It is im-
portant to note that the eﬀect of decentralization on corruption is not only captured
by the interaction term. In fact the marginal impact of decentralization on corrup-
tion depends both on the interaction term and on decentralization. The cutoﬀ val-
ues of freedom of the press, that is, the value of freedom of the press for which
∂(corruption)/∂(decentralization)=0, is 54.9, implying that for roughly a third of the
countries in the sample, increased decentralization is associated with higher corruption.
For countries close to the cutoﬀ value, the eﬀect of decentralization on corruption is
small, while the positive impact of decentralization on corruption in countries with a
high degree of freedom of press is fairly high. The marginal eﬀect is statistically dif-
ferent from zero, with more than 90 percent conﬁdence with a freedom of press value
exceeding roughly 70. In other words, the impact of decentralization on corruption is
signiﬁcantly positive for nearly 50 percent of countries in our sample. Our results imply
that decentralization counteracts corruption in countries with a low degree of freedom
of press (see ﬁgure 2).
This ﬁnding is in line with our results from speciﬁcations (3) and (4), which have shown
a strong negative impact of decentralization on corruption in one third of countries with


















































Freedom of the press 0.90 confidence level
Fig. 2. Marginal eﬀect of decentralization on corruption: Freedom of the press
19Tables A5 and A6 in the appendix shows the major results for robustness tests, using
alternative corruption indices (CPI and WBC) as well as a diﬀerent decentralization
measure (REV DEC – speciﬁcations (19) to (36) and (EMPLDEC – speciﬁcation
(37) to (54)). The econometric speciﬁcations are similar to those of Table 5, but we do
not report coeﬃcients of our control variables due to space limitations. The robustness
checks conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings in most speciﬁcations.
Hitherto we use averages (1996-2000) of the diﬀerent corruption indices as dependent
variables in our regressions. The dependent variable is therefore a continuous variable
and this allows estimates using OLS and TSLS. However, there could be some doubts
on the cardinal nature of corruption indices. One could argue that the commonly
used corruption perception indices only rank the countries from the most to the least
corrupt ones. In this case the indices are ordinal and the relation between the numbers
are unknown. A (rescaled) CPI-value of 0.25 does not imply that the country has twice
the amount of corruption compared to a country with a value of 0.50 (see Soreide
(2005)). This values just means that the former country is more corrupt. Under the
interpretation of ordered corruption variable, the OLS and TSLS estimation procedures
are not applicable. Instead, with ordinal corruption measures a ordered probit model
should be adequate. However, using a ordered probit estimation approach it is diﬃcult
to interpret the magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of our interaction terms. As it
is shown by Ai and Norton (2003) the marginal eﬀects of the interaction terms in
nonlinear models, which are computed by standard statistical software, is incorrect.
In addition, the most corruption indices provide explicit numerical ratings with the
understanding that they are lineare [see Brunetti and Weder (2003)]. Regarding the
severe diﬃculties in the inference of probit models with interaction terms, we have
more conﬁdence to our linear regression results.
Altogether, an examination of the data as well as our regression results show that the
impact of decentralization on corruption depends on the eﬀectiveness of monitoring
of bureaucrats. As long as monitoring works, decentralization is indeed an eﬀective
instrument to keep corruption at bay. Otherwise, if those basic control institutions do
not work, decentralization is harmful. This result contrasts the ﬁndings of most earlier
empirical studies in the ﬁeld, but is in line with theoretical considerations by, e.g.,
Tanzi (1995), Prud’homme (1995), andBardhan (2002).
5 Conclusion
Fiscal decentralization plays a major role, e.g., in World Bank’s anti-corruption and
development strategy. Based on earlier studies that found corruption to be lower in
decentralized countries, decentralization is assumed to be an appropriate instrument
to tackle the corruption disease in developing countries. In line with the majority of
the theoretical literature, we argue that the eﬀectiveness of monitoring bureaucrat’s
20behavior is an important determinant of the relationship between decentralization and
corruption. To test this hypothesis empirically, we have analyzed the impact of decen-
tralization on corruption, taking the degree of freedom of the press into account. For
this purpose we applied a broader data set using diﬀerent decentralization and cor-
ruption measures. In contrast to previous studies we are not able to identify a robust
impact of decentralization on corruption in general.
In a second step, we have estimated structural break models, considering the eﬀective-
ness of monitoring bureaucrat’s behavior as measured by freedom of the press. A free
and independent press is able to reveal and report misuses of public oﬃce for private
gain. It complements the competition and accountability eﬀects of decentralization.
We ﬁnd that in countries with an eﬀective monitoring, decentralization has a positive
impact on the absence of corruption. Otherwise, if monitoring does not work, decen-
tralization has a negative eﬀect. This association is robust for a wide range of potential
sources of omitted variable bias as well as endogeneity bias. We also show that these
results are non-sensitive to the underlying measurement concepts of decentralization
and corruption.
The policy implications of our study are obvious: decentralization is a feasible instru-
ment to reduce corruption if the monitoring of bureaucrats works. Otherwise, if those
institutions do not work suﬃciently, decentralization can contribute to high corruption
levels. Institutions linking foreign aid to decentralization initiatives should, therefore,
carefully consider whether the institutional background of the target countries in terms
of an eﬀective public monitoring is adequate. With regard to our research question
whether decentralization is in either case the right medicine against the corruption
disease, the answer is: No! One size does not ﬁt all.
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24A Appendix
Table A1
Pairwise correlation coeﬃcients of diﬀerent decentralization measures
“de jure” “de facto”
FEDERAL TIERS EMPLDEC EXPDEC REVDEC
FEDERAL 1.0000
TIERS .0203 1.0000
EMPLDEC .4115*** -.0235 1.0000
EXPDEC .5795*** -.0232 .6722*** 1.0000
REVDEC .5949*** .0309 .6102*** .9385*** 1.0000
Note: ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table A2
Data sources and deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition Source
POP Population in Mill. WDI
GDPPC Gross Domestic Product per capiata in 2000 dollar WDI
GOVSIZE Government consumption expenditures as share of
GDP
WDI
ETHNO Degree of ethnolinguistic fragtionalization Ethnologue
GLOBAL Imports plus exports as share of GDP WDI
PRESS Index of freedom of press (inverted) Freedom House
ICRG International Country Risk Guide corruption measure
(0 = highest corruption; 6 = absence of corruption)
PRS Group
CPI Corruption Perception Index (0 = highest corruption;
10 = absence of corruption)
Transparency In-
ternational
WBC World Bank corruption measure (-2.5 = highest cor-
ruption; 2.5 = absence of corruption)
World Bank
FEDERAL ”Dummy variable for federal constitutions: 0 = uni-
tary country; 1 = federal country”
Treisman (2002)
TIERS Index for number and democratization of vertical gov-
ernment tiers
Treisman (2002)
EMPLDEC Share of subnational government employment in total
government employment
ILO
EXPDEC Share of subnational government expentitures in total
government expenditures
IMF GFS





Country POP GDPPC GOVSIZE ETHNO GLOBAL PRESS
Albania 3.08 1.03 11.16 0.26 0.48 43.23
Argentina 32.70 7.04 9.73 0.21 0.19 64.00
Australia 17.30 17.05 18.71 0.13 0.37 88.54
Austria 7.79 19.82 19.48 0.54 0.81 82.85
Azerbaijan 7.29 0.74 16.40 0.37 0.97 27.62
Belarus 10.00 1.22 20.28 0.40 1.21 20.00
Belgium 10.00 18.67 21.98 0.73 1.41 90.77
Bolivia 6.98 0.94 12.96 0.68 0.48 75.85
Brazil 151.00 3.26 15.35 0.03 0.19 66.69
Bulgaria 8.55 1.57 16.45 0.22 0.91 64.15
Canada 28.20 19.59 21.47 0.55 0.63 84.31
Chile 13.40 3.60 11.50 0.03 0.57 73.62
China 1150.00 0.51 12.94 0.49 0.35 18.08
Colombia 36.20 1.85 14.00 0.03 0.34 42.31
Costa Rica 3.15 3.46 14.64 0.05 0.79 82.92
Croatia 4.60 3.89 25.21 0.87 1.03 49.92
Czech Republic 10.30 5.16 22.16 0.07 1.13 78.85
Denmark 5.21 25.37 26.26 0.05 0.70 90.62
Dominican Republic 7.25 1.81 6.42 0.31 0.71 67.00
Estonia 1.47 3.64 19.96 0.48 1.51 79.69
Ethiopia 52.60 0.10 15.60 0.84 0.32 35.62
Finland 5.02 19.25 21.50 0.14 0.60 87.08
France 56.90 19.12 23.31 0.27 0.46 77.38
Germany 80.10 19.47 20.26 0.19 0.53 85.46
Hungary 10.40 4.09 10.64 0.16 0.90 72.69
India 875.00 0.34 11.54 0.93 0.20 58.77
Indonesia 182.00 0.59 8.86 0.85 0.55 39.54
Iran, Islamic Rep. 54.50 1.36 14.24 0.80 0.33 22.15
Ireland 3.61 15.84 17.47 0.22 1.28 82.62
Israel 5.11 15.23 31.79 0.67 0.85 71.15
Italy 57.00 16.10 18.78 0.59 0.45 70.85
Kazakhstan 15.70 1.27 12.70 0.70 0.90 31.92
Kenya 24.30 0.36 17.53 0.90 0.59 36.92
Latvia 2.54 3.29 14.29 0.60 1.05 78.46
Lithuania 3.57 3.26 20.46 0.34 1.04 79.23
Malaysia 19.00 2.87 13.60 0.76 1.57 34.15
Mexico 85.40 5.23 10.09 0.14 0.42 51.85
Moldova 4.25 0.57 17.30 0.59 1.22 42.38
Mongolia 2.13 0.48 25.55 0.33 1.20 66.00
Netherlands 15.10 19.06 24.14 0.39 1.10 86.08
New Zealand 3.53 16.11 18.75 0.10 0.59 91.62
Nicaragua 4.09 0.84 22.83 0.08 0.62 57.54
Norway 4.30 31.52 20.76 0.66 0.73 92.69
Panama 2.47 3.50 15.69 0.32 1.55 67.31
Paraguay 4.33 1.50 7.26 0.35 0.62 48.08
Peru 22.30 2.01 9.83 0.38 0.33 49.85
Philippines 63.80 0.94 10.29 0.85 0.73 62.92
Poland 37.80 3.68 18.35 0.06 0.52 77.62
Portugal 10.00 8.16 16.91 0.02 0.67 84.00
Romania 22.60 1.87 10.81 0.17 0.61 55.15
Russian Federation 145.00 1.94 17.85 0.28 0.57 40.69
Slovak Republic 5.28 3.53 21.62 0.31 1.15 66.92
Slovenia 1.98 8.53 20.55 0.17 1.18 74.54
South Africa 36.60 3.06 18.46 0.87 0.50 72.77
Spain 39.10 11.22 16.76 0.44 0.44 81.23
Sri Lanka 16.70 0.66 9.49 0.31 0.74 44.77
Sweden 8.62 22.90 27.97 0.17 0.68 90.38
Switzerland 6.81 31.52 11.10 0.55 0.72 90.85
Thailand 55.60 1.53 11.12 0.75 0.80 62.46
Trinidad and Tobago 1.22 5.77 14.55 0.70 0.84 72.92
United Kingdom 57.70 20.10 20.22 0.14 0.53 80.00
United States 257.00 28.72 16.23 0.35 0.21 85.85
Uruguay 3.14 5.20 12.96 0.09 0.41 72.38
Zimbabwe 10.40 0.58 18.99 0.53 0.56 29.23
26Table A4
Country statistics – continued
Country ICRG CPI WBC FEDERAL TIERS EMPLDEC EXPDEC REVDEC
Albania 2.22 2.47 -0.67 3 0.12 0.20 0.02
Argentina 2.45 2.97 -0.43 1 3 0.76 0.38 0.32
Australia 4.85 8.67 2.00 1 3 0.63 0.41 0.28
Austria 4.59 7.94 1.97 1 4 0.42 0.30 0.27
Azerbaijan 1.95 1.94 -1.09 3 0.25 0.21
Belarus 2.77 3.55 -0.75 0 4 0.22 0.30 0.28
Belgium 3.73 6.58 1.41 1 4 0.57 0.12 0.06
Bolivia 2.59 2.49 -0.76 0 4 0.11 0.18 0.18
Brazil 2.82 3.76 -0.07 1 4 0.86 0.34 0.25
Bulgaria 2.93 3.73 -0.26 0 4 0.24 0.19 0.16
Canada 5.40 8.88 2.15 1 4 0.64 0.57 0.53
Chile 3.75 7.12 1.36 0 4 0.34 0.08 0.06
China 1.70 3.24 -0.40 0 5 0.93 0.55 0.51
Colombia 2.31 3.28 -0.45 0 3 0.82 0.29 0.19
Costa Rica 3.96 4.91 0.73 0 4 0.09 0.03 0.03
Croatia 2.86 3.51 -0.08 3 0.09 0.09
Czech Republic 3.42 4.46 0.40 0 3 0.32 0.20 0.16
Denmark 5.74 9.64 2.36 1 3 0.65 0.44 0.31
Dominican Republic 3.10 3.10 -0.48 0 3 0.08 0.03 0.01
Estonia 3.77 5.88 0.63 0 3 0.34 0.27 0.21
Ethiopia 2.00 2.68 -0.58 5 0.02 0.02
Finland 6.00 9.65 2.47 0 3 0.78 0.38 0.31
France 3.38 6.87 1.46 0 4 0.44 0.19 0.12
Germany 4.58 7.89 1.92 1 4 0.87 0.41 0.35
Hungary 4.01 5.04 0.64 0 3 0.48 0.21 0.12
India 2.50 2.83 -0.34 1 5 0.49 0.46 0.33
Indonesia 1.47 2.10 -0.94 0 5 0.28 0.11 0.03
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.10 2.88 -0.59 0 4 0.04 0.05
Ireland 3.16 7.64 1.73 0 3 0.24 0.08
Israel 3.38 6.97 1.08 0 3 0.11 0.07
Italy 3.01 4.82 0.68 0 4 0.39 0.22 0.07
Kazakhstan 1.94 2.51 -1.00 4 0.26 0.30 0.28
Kenya 2.28 2.10 -1.03 0 6 0.18 0.05 0.06
Latvia 2.40 3.70 0.03 0 3 0.57 0.23 0.19
Lithuania 2.70 4.55 0.19 3 0.37 0.29 0.22
Malaysia 3.03 5.07 0.39 1 3 0.32 0.19 0.16
Mexico 2.42 3.39 -0.34 1 3 0.29 0.20 0.20
Moldova 1.70 2.65 -0.75 3 0.53 0.29 0.27
Mongolia 2.91 3.28 -0.23 0.36 0.27
Netherlands 5.58 8.85 2.20 0 3 0.25 0.25 0.08
New Zealand 5.26 9.46 2.36 0 3 0.49 0.11 0.09
Nicaragua 3.47 2.69 -0.56 0 4 0.07 0.08
Norway 5.05 8.84 2.10 0 3 0.38 0.33 0.22
Panama 2.00 3.40 -0.31 0 4 0.02 0.02
Paraguay 1.58 1.91 -1.08 0 3 0.04 0.03
Peru 2.82 3.94 -0.28 0 4 0.18 0.07
Philippines 2.52 2.82 -0.49 0 4 0.27 0.10 0.07
Poland 3.25 4.17 0.35 0 3 0.61 0.23 0.15
Portugal 4.36 6.52 1.31 0 0.32 0.10 0.07
Romania 2.72 2.98 -0.33 0 3 0.13 0.09
Russian Federation 1.59 2.47 -0.84 1 4 0.34 0.38 0.40
Slovak Republic 3.15 3.91 0.27 0 4 0.40 0.08 0.08
Slovenia 3.40 5.89 0.96 2 0.16 0.11 0.09
South Africa 3.16 4.87 0.47 0 0.44 0.24 0.14
Spain 4.13 6.53 1.38 1 4 0.60 0.24 0.15
Sri Lanka 3.49 3.38 -0.23 0 4 0.18 0.03 0.04
Sweden 5.69 9.27 2.30 0 3 0.56 0.36 0.33
Switzerland 4.84 8.80 2.23 1 3 0.54 0.51 0.46
Thailand 2.03 3.32 -0.32 0 5 0.41 0.08 0.05
Trinidad and Tobago 2.66 4.33 0.10 0 2 0.04 0.03
United Kingdom 4.73 8.56 2.07 0 4 0.64 0.25 0.13
United States 4.28 7.57 1.76 1 4 0.73 0.44 0.40
Uruguay 3.00 5.23 0.64 0 2 0.34 0.09 0.10
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